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INTRODUCTION
The law of search and seizure is built on flexible standards of
reasonableness, transformed by courts into bright-line rules that balance the
needs of law enforcement against the degree to which a particular police
practice intrudes upon individual privacy interests. The third-party doctrine
is one such rule, holding that police do not need a Fourth Amendment
warrant to access information that an individual has voluntarily disclosed or
conveyed to a third party, such as bank records or call histories. But the
third-party doctrine is quite literally the product of another era—before
ubiquitous networked computing, digital data, electronic communications,
mobile technologies, and the commodification of information. Today, the
digital devices that facilitate our daily participation in modern society are
connected through automated infrastructures that are designed to generate
vast quantities of data, nearly all of which are captured, utilized, and stored
by third-party service providers. Under a plain reading of the third-party
doctrine, however, the substantial majority of that data receives no Fourth
Amendment protection—no matter how sensitive or revealing the
information.
It is generally agreed that the balance struck in the third-party doctrine
is no longer reasonable, as it fails to account for the far greater degree of
privacy intrusion occasioned by warrantless government access to all of this
personal data. Acknowledging that current approaches fail to adequately
account for rapid advancements in information technology and analytics,
the Supreme Court has responded in several recent cases by creating specific,
narrow exceptions to the third-party doctrine for certain devices and data.
But in the absence of a more generalized and coherent approach, lower
courts have struggled to understand and apply these cases to other
technologies and types of data, leading to uneven and often contradictory
results.
This Article proposes a new analytical framework for adapting the
third-party doctrine to the new-information environment. Drawing on the
Court’s recent decisions, this Article advances a three-step approach for the
development of workable, bright-line rules governing the search and seizure
of different categories of data. It identifies both guiding principles and
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competing interests, as well as the specific factors to be considered in
assessing the legitimacy and relative strength of those interests. It then
explains the relationship between those factors and their role in the
balancing process that produces appropriate and workable rules. The goal is
to provide a consistent, practical framework to be applied more generally
across the different categories of data generated by digital technologies and
services.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I identifies the public/private
distinction as the dominant principle and primary limit on the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections. I argue that the enduring and influential
facet of Katz v. United States1 is not Justice Harlan’s “reasonable expectation
of privacy” test2 but rather the majority’s distinction between that which “a
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . [and] what he seeks to preserve
as private.”3 I explore the origins of this public/private distinction in the
“public exposure” and “third-party disclosure” cases, its use in
subordination of property interests, and its consequential extension to the
third-party doctrine. This discussion helps to establish the significance of the
Court’s recent decisions in United States v. Jones (2012),4 Riley v. California
(2014),5 and Carpenter v. United States (2018).6
Part II argues that Jones, Riley, and Carpenter subvert the dominant role
of the public/private distinction, with significant implications for the thirdparty doctrine. Third-party disclosure is transformed from a bright-line rule
into a single element of a broader balancing test, in which an individual’s
privacy interest in a particular category of information is weighed against the
diminishing effect of disclosure or conveyance. In some cases, those privacy
interests will be weighty enough to overcome the third-party disclosure and
the Fourth Amendment’s protections will therefore apply.
In Part III, I propose an analytical framework to be applied by lower
courts in developing workable, bright-line rules governing the search and
seizure of the different categories of data. First, I identify four key factors to
be applied in the analysis: pervasive devices and information services;

1
2
3
4
5
6

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 351–52 (1967) (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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automated data generation and collection; the nature of the metadata
generated and collected; and the linking of that metadata to the “privacies of
life.”7 Second, I propose a three-step analysis that begins by determining the
strength and legitimacy of an individual’s privacy interest in the information
sought by the government. Here, the court examines both the possibility and
probability that the category of data sought by the government will reveal
sensitive information. Possibility simply refers to a direct and reliable link
between the data and the sensitive information, i.e., the ability to derive
information from the data. Probability is assessed on a sliding scale that
considers both the precision/detail and amount/density of the data. In
addition, individuals are likely to have a stronger privacy interest in large sets
of historical, retrospective data. Next, the court determines the extent to
which disclosure or conveyance of personal information to a third party
diminishes that privacy interest. In making this determination, the court
considers both the extent to which the device or service generating the data
is a necessity to participation in a modern society and the user’s practical
ability to control the conveyance of data to a third party during the use of
that device or service. Finally, the court balances the individual privacy
interest against the diminishing effect of third-party disclosure, using
fundamental Fourth Amendment principles to guide its evaluation. In the
final Section of Part III, the proposed framework is tested by application to
other automated technologies and metadata sets, using real-time cell phone
location tracking and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses as examples.
I. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION: FROM KATZ TO THE THIRD-PARTY
DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause.”8 Reading the Amendment’s substantive and
procedural clauses as connected, the Supreme Court held that searches and
seizures undertaken without first securing a warrant are presumptively

7
8

Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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unreasonable.9 This presumption may be overcome, however, in two
common circumstances: first, on the front end, by demonstrating that no
search or seizure occurred and thus no warrant was required;10 or second,
on the back end, by showing that a warrantless search or seizure was
nevertheless reasonable because it “falls within a specific exception to the
warrant requirement.”11
In the first of these circumstances, the key question is how one
determines whether a “search” has occurred within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. For much of the twentieth century, the “liberty and
privacy rights” secured by the Fourth Amendment “were understood largely
in terms of property rights,”12 but evolving societal practices and
advancements in technology led the Court to adopt a more flexible standard
intended to expand the concept of a Fourth Amendment search. In
describing this shift, the conventional narrative focuses on two paradigmatic
cases, Olmstead v. United States13 and Katz v. United States.14 In this
simplified telling, the Katz decision is characterized as a fault line in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence—introducing an entirely new standard that
replaces Olmstead’s rigid, property-based safeguards with more flexible,
expansive, privacy-based protections.15 These are mere caricatures, however,
obscuring the emergence of a more demanding standard that, rather than

9 See Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant
Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 541–43 (1997) (discussing the
relationship between Fourth Amendment warrants and reasonableness, and the Supreme Court’s
asserted preference for the traditional warrant requirement); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221
(“[W]arrantless searches are typically unreasonable . . . [unless they] fall[] within a specific exception to
the warrant requirement.” (citation omitted)).
10 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“[T]he antecedent question whether or
not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ has occurred is not so simple under our precedent.”).
11 Riley, 573 U.S. at 382 (citation omitted).
12 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239 (quoting Morgan Cloud, Property Is Privacy: Locke and Brandeis in
the Twenty-First Century, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 37, 42 (2018)).
13 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
14 389 U.S. 347.
15 See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.1(b) (5th ed. 2019) (observing that “it is no overstatement to say, as the commentators
have asserted, that Katz ‘marks a watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence’ because the Court
‘purported to clean house on outmoded fourth amendment principles’ and moved ‘toward a
redefinition of the scope of the Fourth Amendment’” (internal citation omitted)).
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expanding the concept of a Fourth Amendment search, sharply limits
privacy protections for those engaged in modern information society.
A.

Katz v. United States: The Conventional Telling

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
limited application of the warrant requirement to a narrow class of
government actions constituting a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. A search was said to occur only where enforcement
officers “obtain[] information by physically intruding on a constitutionally
protected area.”16 These protected areas were limited to property in which
the targeted individual held an ownership or possessory interest, while
physical intrusion required that officers commit common-law trespass upon
property.17 Olmstead provides the canonical example. In that case, the
defendants spoke with one another using landline telephones located within
the privacy of their respective homes18—an area at the “very core” of the
Fourth Amendment.19 Law enforcement officials intercepted these
conversations by placing taps on telephone lines located immediately
outside the homes on nearby streets.20 The Court held that no Fourth
Amendment search had occurred because placement of the taps did not
require the officers to physically enter the defendants’ homes—i.e., “without
trespass upon any property of the defendants.”21 Moreover, the oral
conversations transcribed by federal officers were not the type of tangible

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s “close connection to property”);
id. (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter
half of the 20th century.” (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))); see also Nita A.
Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV . 1239, 1244–46 (2012) (observing that Fourth
Amendment doctrine is grounded in property concepts); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (referencing
the historic connection between Fourth Amendment protections and trespass upon property).
18 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456.
19 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (citation omitted); see also Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (stating that “the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed
‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic.’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980))).
20 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57.
21 Id. at 457, 466.
16
17
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objects that are protected from search or seizure.22 In the absence of a search,
no warrant was required.23
Justice Brandeis, writing in dissent, recognized that such a rigid
approach would create opportunities for evasion. He cautioned that
technological advancement would bring “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching
means of invading privacy” without physical intrusion and in the absence of
trespass, the government would be able “to expose . . . the most intimate
occurrences of the home” without implicating constitutional safeguards.24
In Katz,25 the Court sought to rectify the shortcomings of the Olmstead
approach by extending the concept of private spaces beyond formal property
lines, to other areas and situations in which an individual enjoys a legitimate
expectation of privacy.26 The material facts of the case were fairly similar to
those presented in Olmstead. Law enforcement agents had “attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of . . . [an enclosed]
public telephone booth” commonly used by Katz to conduct a gambling
operation.27 Applying the Olmstead analysis, the court of appeals held that
no search had occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
because Katz’s conversations had been obtained without law enforcement
physically entering the area occupied by the defendant.28 But the Supreme
Court abruptly reversed course—rejecting Olmstead’s rigid, property-based
approach in favor of a more flexible analysis of individual privacy interests.
It is commonly understood that the persistent standard to emerge from
Katz came not from the majority opinion but from Justice Harlan’s
concurrence.29 Building off the majority’s holding that property interests no

22
23
24

Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 473–74 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012) (describing the shift in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), from the “exclusively property-based approach” to the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” approach).
27 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
28 Id. at 348–49.
29 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018) (discussing the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard in Katz).
25
26
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longer control the analysis,30 Harlan concluded that a search instead occurs
when government officials violate an individual’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”31 The latter interest requires “first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’”32
Applying that standard, the Court found that “an enclosed telephone booth
is an area where, like a home . . . a person has a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy.”33 Moreover, the Court held that a
cognizable intrusion upon that privacy interest may occur “by electronic as
well as physical invasion.”34 It was therefore immaterial that the electronic
surveillance device used in this case did not penetrate the walls of the
telephone booth.35 Finally, the Court affirmed that Fourth Amendment
protections are not limited to the seizure of tangible items but also apply to
intangible interests, such as private oral conversations.36
When Katz was first decided, “commentators believed this formulation
would expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment.”37 But the reality of
post-Katz jurisprudence proved significantly more complex than this
conventional narrative suggests. With the end of the Warren Court in the
late 1960s, the Court’s expansive understanding of Katz began almost
immediately to erode on multiple fronts. Although the Court had apparently
forsaken rigid, property-based rules in favor of more flexible standards, it
had not abandoned its strong preference for workable, bright-line rules.38
30

In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan indicated that he “join[ed] the opinion of
the Court,” but then explained what he took that opinion to mean. Because lower courts
attempting to interpret and apply Katz quickly came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration, as
ultimately did a majority of the Supreme Court . . . .
LAFAVE, supra note 15.
31 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32 Id. at 361.
33 Id. at 360.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 353 (majority opinion).
36 Id.
37 Christopher Slobogin, Distinguished Lecture: Surveillance and the Constitution, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1105, 1111 (2009); see Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 330 (1998).
38 See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.1(b) (5th ed. 2019); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
34
35
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Amid this tension, the Court found it difficult to commit to the case-by-case,
contextual approach suggested by Katz. The Court was unable to shake its
conception of privacy as “a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not
at all.”39
It is now commonly argued that Katz effectively reframed the Fourth
Amendment analysis but without significantly altering its substance. The
Court, favoring clear guidelines, has continued to privilege property
ownership and possessory interests in its analysis of privacy expectations.40
And indeed, the Court has acknowledged as much, holding that “one who
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”41 But this
observation, although generally correct as a matter of outcome, obscures a
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 861–62 (2004)
(positing “rule clarity” as a goal of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 581–82 (2009) (“The on/off switch of the suppression
remedy demands clear Fourth Amendment rules on what police conduct triggers Fourth Amendment
protection and what police conduct does not.”); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an
Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 325–27 (1982)
(setting forth various factors to consider when determining whether to adopt bright-line rules in the
Fourth Amendment context); Melanie D. Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the Fourth
Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2008) (arguing in favor of “clear
rules” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
39 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748–49 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of expectations of privacy
by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the
main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, and one who owns or lawfully possesses
or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right
to exclude. Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based
on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest. These
ideas were rejected both in Jones and Katz. But by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts
in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.”
(citations omitted)); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1984). In Carpenter, the
majority opinion and each of the four dissenting opinions reaffirmed the connection between Fourth
Amendment protections and trespass-upon-property. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14; id. at 2227
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Katz did not abandon reliance on property-based concepts.”); id. at 2235–
36 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting Katz, 389 U.S. 347, in favor of a property-based approach); id. at
2260 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith, 442
U.S. 735, as turning on the defendants’ lack of property rights in the property of another); id. at 2267–
71 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a return to property concepts might resolve difficulties
arising in regard to the third-party doctrine).
41 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
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more broadly significant and enduring facet of the Katz analysis: the central
role of the public/private distinction in limiting the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections.
B.

Revisiting Katz: The Public/Private Distinction

The Katz analysis is best understood as an amalgam of the majority
opinion and Justice Harlan’s concurrence, read as an integrated whole. Four
related points are particularly salient. First, a Fourth Amendment “search”
occurs when the government (a) impermissibly intrudes (b) upon a
legitimate privacy interest (c) in order to obtain information.42 Second,
legitimate privacy interests are not to be rigidly defined by property
ownership or possessory interests, but rather by employing Harlan’s twopronged “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard.43 Third, in applying
this standard, both the majority opinion and Harlan’s concurrence make an
essential distinction between public exposure and the preservation of
privacy. The majority holds that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”44 Harlan
makes a similar distinction, differentiating between “a man’s home . . . a
place where he expects privacy” and “objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders.”45 Likewise, conversations that take
place in “an enclosed telephone booth” away from “the uninvited ear” are
protected, while “conversations in the open” are not.46 Finally, as these
examples suggest, the public/private distinction is often defined by reference
to concealment within private areas or places.47 This focus on concealment
ensured that property interests, although not controlling, remain a
significant consideration.

42 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–12 (1961)).
43 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44 Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46
47

Id. at 352, 360–61 (majority opinion and then Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Viewed in isolation, Katz appeared at first to dramatically expand the
concept of a Fourth Amendment search by decoupling individual privacy
interests from the rigid limits of real and personal property. In place of this
property approach, the Court adopted a contextual analysis of both an
individual’s subjective expectations and society’s willingness to recognize
those expectations as reasonable. This more flexible approach had the effect,
in at least some cases, of extending protection beyond those areas
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment and into the public sphere; here, a
public telephone booth.48
But this new flexible, contextual approach proved difficult to apply.
The “unjust”49 certainty of Olmstead had merely been replaced with the
impractical uncertainty of Katz. It is this uncertainty—so at odds with the
Court’s preference for workable, bright-line rules—that precipitated the
emergence of the binary public/private distinction as a dominant limit on
the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.
The public/private distinction is rooted in two distinct strands of preKatz case law. The first involves the exposure of evidence to the prying eyes
and ears of the public, and by extension to law enforcement personnel
(public exposure). The other addresses the disclosure of information to a
particular third-party, such as an undercover officer or informant (thirdparty disclosure).
1.

The Public Exposure Cases

The first strand of cases involves the exposure of acts, objects, or
information to the public, even where an individual seeks to seclude himself
within the bounds of property or through practical obscurity. In the first of
the public exposure cases cited in Katz, United States v. Lee,50 a Coast Guard
patrol boat followed suspected bootlegger, Lee, to a rendezvous point
twenty-four miles from land.51 Using a searchlight to illuminate the deck of
the bootlegger’s boat, crew members spotted cases of illegal grain alcohol.52

48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 353 (majority opinion).
LAFAVE, supra note 15.
274 U.S. 559 (1927).
Id. at 560.
Id. at 560–61.
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This led them to board the vessel and ultimately to Lee’s arrest.53 Despite the
bootleggers’ attempts to seclude their activities by retreating to the middle of
the ocean, the Court held that no search had taken place within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, because the contraband had been left exposed to
observers.54 In reaching its conclusion, the Lee court relied on Hester v.
United States,55 in which revenue officers crossed onto private land owned
by the defendant’s family for the purpose of conducting surveillance.56 From
their position in defendant’s “open fields,” the officers observed the
defendant and an accomplice handling contraband in plain view.57 The
Court held, first, that the trespass itself did not constitute a search, because
“the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to . . . ‘persons,
houses, papers and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.”58 And second,
as in Lee, the “defendant’s own acts” exposed incriminating evidence to
onlookers.59
The next case cited in Katz, Rios v. United States,60 distinguishes these
public exposure cases from those in which the individual seeks to conceal his
conversations and property.61 The underlying facts, although disputed,
generally involved “[a] passenger who [let] a package drop to the floor of the
taxicab in which he [was] riding.”62 Differentiating between concealment in
a private vehicle on the one hand and exposure or abandonment on the
other, the Court held that “[a]n occupied taxicab is not to be compared to an
open field . . . or a vacated hotel room.”63 Finally, in Ex parte Jackson,64 the
Court drew a clear line between sealed letters and packages “intended to be
kept free from inspection . . . except as to their outward form” and other
types of printed matter “purposely left in a condition to be examined,” such

Id. at 560.
Id. at 563 (holding that the use of a spotlight to inspect the boat was no different than “the use of
a marine glass or a field glass”).
55 Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
56 Hester, 265 U.S. at 58–59.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 58.
60 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
61 Id. at 261–62, 262 n.6.
62 Id. at 261–62.
53
54

63
64

Id. at 262 n.6 (citations omitted).
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
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as newspapers and magazines.65 In making this distinction, the Court
analogized sealed letters and packages to the objects located within the
senders’ “own domiciles”66—safeguarding that which is concealed from both
the public and government officials.
These cases illuminate a key aspect of the public/private distinction,
drawing a line between seclusion and concealment. On the one hand, these
cases affirm that “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” stands at “the very core”
of the Fourth Amendment67—such that acts, objects, or information
concealed within the home’s interior remain protected. The same is true of
certain other private areas, such as the taxicab in Rios,68 provided that the
relevant evidence remains concealed within that space and out of view of the
public.69 On the other hand, all that occurs outside of these concealed areas
is deemed to have been “knowingly expos[ed] to the public” and “is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection,”70 even if, as in Hester, the home
is secluded from the public by the operation of property law and a
corresponding right to exclude.71 An officer’s trespass across open fields
does not immunize that which is knowingly exposed and thus observed.72
Moreover, even the most drastic efforts to physically isolate oneself or
obscure illegal activity are generally insufficient to overcome the public
exposure rule. What is visible—at night, by spotlight, on the open sea, miles
from shore73—is said to be in plain view, exposed to the public. The apparent
seclusion provided by private property rights in land or miles of open ocean
bears little constitutional significance. Although concealment indoors or
below decks may have been sufficient.

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 733.
Id.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
Rios, 364 U.S. at 261–62.
Id. at 262.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
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The Third-Party Disclosure Cases

The second strand of cases supporting Katz’s public/private distinction
are those in which an individual discloses information to a third party—e.g.,
to an undercover officer or informant. The Katz decision cites74 specifically
to Lewis v. United States,75 in which an undercover narcotics agent was twice
invited into the suspect’s home to consummate a drug transaction.76 The
Court acknowledged that “the home is accorded the full range of Fourth
Amendment protections,”77 and that the agent gained entry to the home
only by misrepresenting his identity.78 Nevertheless, the Court found that no
search had occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.79 Key
to this conclusion was that on “neither of his visits to petitioner’s home did
the agent see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and in fact
intended, by petitioner as a necessary part of his illegal business.”80 In other
words, the suspect had voluntarily disclosed incriminating information and
physical evidence to a government agent.
The Lewis Court compared81 this result to its contrary conclusion in
Gouled v. United States,82 in which an informant secured by subterfuge an
invitation to the suspect’s office.83 Once inside he “secretly ransacked the
office and seized certain private papers of an incriminating nature.”84 The
fundamental difference between Lewis and Gouled was the voluntariness of
the suspect’s disclosures. In Lewis, the suspect had chosen not only to admit
the third party to his home, but to provide him with information and
contraband. In Gouled, only the first of these conditions had been met. The
suspect had freely admitted the informant to his office but had not willingly
disclosed anything. It was the involuntary nature of the disclosure that
established the Fourth Amendment violation.
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
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83
84

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
385 U.S. 206 (1966).
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 206–07.
Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 209–10.
255 U.S. 298 (1921), abrogated by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Id. at 304.
Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210 (describing the facts of Gouled, 255 U.S. 298).
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The import of these third-party disclosure cases is best understood by
revisiting the two basic rules that emerged from the public exposure cases.
First, what is concealed from observation by its location within certain
private areas (e.g., homes, taxicabs) is protected by the Fourth Amendment
against search and seizure.85 Second, although enforcement officers may
trespass on certain forms of private property (e.g., open fields) to better
observe acts, objects, or information in plain view, they may not physically
intrude upon the private area itself in order to gain access to that which is
concealed. Thus, these cases make clear that seclusion within the bounds of
property86 or through practical obscurity87 is generally insufficient to protect
oneself from government intrusion—a legitimate privacy interest instead
requires physical concealment within a limited number of protected private
areas.
The third-party disclosure cases maintain the distinction between
seclusion and concealment, but effectively impose even more stringent
requirements for legally effective concealment. Thus, an undercover officer
or informant who is invited to enter an otherwise protected private area has
not impermissibly intruded within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment—even where the invitation is obtained by misrepresentation.88
Likewise, once the officer is permissibly located within that private area, the
observation of acts, conversations, and objects in plain view does not
constitute a search.89 Moreover, the memorialization or recording of oral
conversations occurring within the private area is not in itself a seizure of
that communication.90 In sum, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
do not apply to the voluntary disclosure of incriminating information or
physical evidence to any third party who is permissibly located (even if by
deception) within an otherwise protected private area. Instead, the
public/private distinction appears to demand absolute concealment within
a protected private space, in near isolation and silence.
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After Katz: The Continued Subordination of Property

This brings us back to the prevailing account of post-Katz Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Although Katz reframes the analysis around an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, critics argue that this
standard remains stubbornly linked to an individual’s interest in property.
But this critique tends to overstate the correlation. Private property interests
and the right to exclude are simply one mechanism by which an individual
may “seek[] to preserve [that which is] private.”91 And it is the private/public
distinction, rather than the bounds of property, that remains the central
principle for determining the existence, scope, and degree of Fourth
Amendment privacy interests. Indeed, a persistent thread running through
the cases relied upon in Katz is the failure of personal property interests to
secure privacy protections. A Fourth Amendment privacy interest might be
created by physical concealment within one of a few select spaces, but retreat
into seclusion—whether by the legal right to exclude, physical barriers to
entry, or practical obscurity—fails to provide the same protection.
This point is exemplified by the Court’s aerial surveillance decisions. In
California v. Ciraolo,92 for example, Ciraolo was suspected of maintaining a
marijuana garden within the protected curtilage of his home.93 The garden
itself was surrounded by a ten-foot fence.94 Ciraolo’s entire yard was
enclosed by a second, six-foot fence.95 Unable to see the garden from ground
level, police “secured a private plane and flew over [Ciraolo’s] house at an
altitude of 1,000 feet.”96 Officers visually identified the marijuana growing in
Ciraolo’s yard and photographed the area using “a standard 35mm
camera.”97 In concluding that no search had occurred, the Court held that
what an officer is able to observe “from a public vantage point where he has
a right to be” has been “knowingly exposed to the public . . . . [It is] not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection”98—even where the suspect
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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conducts his activities within a constitutionally protected area and employs
exceptional measures to shield those activities from public view. In practice,
therefore, a legitimate expectation of privacy often requires absolute
concealment within the interior of an enclosed, constitutionally protected
area, effectively obscured from external observation.
The public/private distinction has also been applied to justify physical
trespass upon private property interests. The “open-fields doctrine”99
provides an example of this corrosive process. The Court has long held that
a person’s house stands at “the very core of the Fourth Amendment.”100
Likewise, certain lands immediately adjacent to the dwelling itself (referred
to as curtilage) are considered to be part of the home for Fourth Amendment
purposes.101 Physical intrusion upon the house or its curtilage will thus likely
constitute a search, triggering the presumptive need for a warrant.102 But any
privately-owned land beyond the narrow bounds of the curtilage is classified
as open fields, left unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.103 As such,
physical trespass upon open fields is not considered to be a search,104 and all
observable acts, objects, and information located there are said to have been
exposed to the public in plain view.
This open fields concept has been broadly applied to “any unoccupied
or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage”105—including, for example,
“wooded areas, desert, vacant lots in urban areas, open beaches, reservoirs,
and open waters.”106 Individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy
within these areas, even when privately held, and may not create a legitimate
expectation by secluding the land with fences, locked gates, and “no
99 Open-Fields Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the open-fields
doctrine as “[t]he rule permitting a warrantless search of the area outside a property owner’s curtilage;
the principle that no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in anything in plain sight”).
100 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (brackets omitted). “[T]he Court since the
Enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home
that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.’” Oliver v. United States 466
U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 601).
101 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 176 (holding that the “special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people
in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields.” (quoting Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924))).
104 Id. at 183.
105
106

Id. at 180 n.11.
LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 2.4(a).
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trespassing” signs.107 United States v. Dunn108 provides a somewhat extreme
example. Dunn owned a 198-acre ranch surrounded by a perimeter fence.109
The property also contained several interior fences, constructed
mainly of posts and multiple strands of barbed wire. The ranch
residence was situated ½ mile from a public road. A fence encircled
the residence and a nearby small greenhouse. Two barns were
located approximately 50 yards from this fence. The front of the
larger of the two barns was enclosed by a wooden fence and had an
open overhang. Locked, waist-high gates barred entry into the barn
proper, and netting material stretched from the ceiling to the top
of the wooden gates.110
Officers entered Dunn’s private property without a warrant, walking
hundreds of yards to reach the out-buildings.111 They crossed over the
perimeter fence, two interior wooden fences, and two barbed wire fences.112
Finally, standing at the locked gate of the larger barn, officers used a
flashlight to illuminate the interior of the barn and observed what they
believed to be a drug lab.113
Accepting for the sake of argument that the barn enjoyed Fourth
Amendment protection, the Court nevertheless found that no search had
taken place.114 The Court determined that the area immediately in front of
the barn gate was an “open field” outside the curtilage of the house.115 It then
held that “there is no constitutional difference between police observations
conducted while in a public place and while standing in the open fields.”116
The Dunn case illustrates two key points regarding post-Katz
jurisprudence. First, although Katz eliminated the physical trespass
requirement as a means of securing privacy against non-intrusive
surveillance technologies, the practical effect has been to authorize
government intrusion onto vast swaths of private property. Even the most
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
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extreme efforts to legally and physically seclude oneself within the bounds
of real property often fail to create a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Property interests are instead merely one factor to be considered in
determining an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests. Second, what an
officer is able to observe while physically located in open fields or other
unprotected areas of private property—i.e., outside the residential dwelling
or its curtilage—is considered to be in plain view of the public (i.e., public
exposure), including that which an officer is able to observe within the
interior of dwellings using his natural senses. Thus, the officer’s trespass to
private property is equated to his presence on land that is open to the public
or on to which he has been invited by the owner. Indeed, the Supreme Court
recently affirmed that officers may even enter those areas of curtilage that
are generally considered open to the public under prevailing social norms,
provided that they do so for legitimate reasons,117 and that observations
made from that position using their natural senses may be treated as being
in plain view.118
D.

A Third-Party Doctrine of Exposure and Disclosure

As just described, Katz derives the public/private distinction from two
distinct strands of pre-Katz jurisprudence: the public exposure cases and the
third-party disclosure cases.119 In public exposure cases, the Court
emphasizes the material difference between effective concealment and
efforts to seclude.120 Seclusion relies primarily on private property interests
and the legal right to exclude to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy,
creating a buffer zone between individual and observer within which the
individual is purportedly free to operate in the open.121 Under Katz and its
progeny, however, it is nearly impossible to establish a legitimate privacy

117 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (indicating that “the background social norms that invite
a visitor to the front door do not invite [a police officer] there to conduct a search”); see also id. at 8
(discussing “the habits of the country,” implied invitations, and licenses).
118 Id. at 7–9 (distinguishing between the observations of an officer who merely enters the curtilage
as “any private citizen might do” and the introduction of a trained police dog for the purpose of
investigating with heighted senses).
119 See supra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2.
120
121

See supra Section I.B.1.
See supra Section I.B.2.
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interest solely through legal or physical seclusion.122 Government officials
are permitted, for example, to trespass upon open fields to observe objects,
activities, or conversations occurring on or within private property123 and to
photograph from the air those areas of private property that cannot be seen
from the ground.124 As a result, a legitimate privacy interest must generally
be established through effective and absolute concealment within a
diminishing number of constitutionally protected areas—e.g., within the
interior of a dwelling house, obscured from external observation.
As the third-party disclosure cases demonstrate, however, even these
core concealment protections are subject to exception. Undercover officers
and informants are permitted, for instance, to gain entrance to an
individual’s home under false pretenses.125 Once in the home, many of the
objects, activities, and conversations concealed within its interior and thus
effectively obscured from external observation are now in plain view or
hearing of the government’s agent.126 The suspect’s legitimate expectation of
privacy within the home—a stronghold of retreat and seclusion from public
life—is no longer justified because he invited a third party into a protected
space, voluntarily disclosed incriminating information, and assumed the
risk that the invitee might in turn reveal that information to the
government.127 In the absence of effective concealment and absolute silence,
no warrant is required to gather that information.128 Moreover, the
government is not required to obtain a subpoena or other formal process to
compel production from these cooperating witnesses. They are free to
disclose what they know.
The third-party doctrine129 applies these same principles to personal
information disclosed to a private individual or institution for the purpose
of facilitating the provision of goods or services, as opposed to information
gathered by a government agent or informant in the course of an
investigation. At the time Katz was decided, these transactional disclosures
See supra Section I.C.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303–05 (1987).
124 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209–13 (1986).
125 See supra Section I.B.2.
126 See supra Sections I.B.2, I.C.
127 See supra Section I.B.2.
128 See supra Section I.C.
129 The third-party doctrine refers to the “principle that one has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information that one has voluntarily disclosed to one or more third parties.” Third-Party
Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
122
123
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generally represented a small universe of confidential relationships in which
sensitive information (e.g., health, financial) would be entrusted to a thirdparty professional (e.g., doctor, banker) for a limited purpose and then
retained as a business record. Outside the context of the underlying
confidential relationship, however, this same information might prove
valuable to law and regulatory enforcement. To what extent is this
information protected by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement?
The Supreme Court addressed this precise question in the first of two
principal cases establishing the third-party doctrine.
In United States v. Miller,130 a criminal defendant challenged the use of
a subpoena to compel the production of checks, deposit slips, and other
records held by his bank.131 Relying on Katz, Miller characterized the
information obtained from his bank as “copies of personal records that were
made available to the banks for a limited purpose . . . in which he ha[d] a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”132 As such, Miller argued, enforcement
officials were required to secure a warrant before seizing the records, rather
than a mere subpoena. But the Court, relying on the public exposure rule
enunciated by the Katz majority133—that “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection”134—found no legitimate expectation of privacy in “information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course of business.”135 Drawing on principles from the informant
cases, the Court held that an individual “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government,” even where the information is disclosed for a limited
purpose.136 It made no difference that the information was gathered and held
by a private institution, rather than an undercover agent or informant.
It was a shocking result that seemingly defied prevailing privacy
expectations regarding the provision of sensitive financial information to a
trusted professional or institution. Congress responded by passing the Right
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to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), which provided protections similar to
those that would be required if the Fourth Amendment applied.137
Nevertheless, the constitutional relevance of the third-party doctrine as a
manifestation of the public/private distinction remained undisturbed.
Almost immediately, the third-party doctrine faced a technological
challenge to its animating principle. Earlier cases had reasoned that
individuals who voluntarily disclose information to another human being
do not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information,
because the recipient may choose to reveal it to the government. But what
happens when you remove the human from the system? In the telephone
industry, for instance, human operators were being replaced by automated
switching equipment.138 The data captured by that system was therefore
highly unlikely to ever be observed by a living person with the capacity to
assess the information, and to choose whether to convey it to the
government. With no human involved in the process, there would seem to
be little appreciable risk of disclosure139—unless, of course, enforcement
officers were to compel the owner of an automated system to gather the
relevant information and provide it to authorities.140 The Court considered
these issues in the second of these principal third-party doctrine cases.
In Smith v. Maryland,141 the defendant claimed a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his home phone,142 a
record of which had been collected by a pen register installed on the
telephone company’s automated switching system.143 In rejecting this
assertion, the Court adopted an even more expansive statement of the thirdparty doctrine that omits any reference to exposure, disclosure, or actual
observation, instead focusing on conveyance and possession, holding that “a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
137 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2018); see Presley v. United States, 895 F.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2018); Dean
Galaro, A Reconsideration of Financial Privacy and United States v. Miller, 59 S. TEX. L. REV . 31, 42
(2017); W. Faith McElroy, Closing the Financial Privacy Loophole: Defining “Access” in the Right to
Financial Privacy Act, 94 WASH. U. L. REV . 1057, 1058 (2017).
138 See generally Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581,
586 (2011).
139 Id. at 585.
140 Id. at 589–96 (discussing governmental processes for accessing third-party data).
141 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
142
143

See id. at 742.
See id. at 741, 744–45.
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voluntarily turns over to third parties.”144 Applying that standard to the
automated dialing system, the Court concluded:
[P]etitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here.
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and “exposed”
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.145
The Court thereby extends the exposure rationale of the third-party
doctrine to the exchange of intangible information with an automated thirdparty processing system.146 Human observation is irrelevant.147 It is generally
enough that the information is conveyed, captured, and stored in the
ordinary course of business, and is therefore available for possible
examination148—even if only at the direction of authorities.
Although application of the third-party doctrine to an automated
system may strain the limits of the assumption-of-risk rationale, it is entirely
consistent with a rigid public/private distinction that demands effective
concealment and absolute silence. First, the Court has rejected as insufficient
efforts to seclude information by retreating within legal and physical
barriers.149 As such, the contractual guarantees and data-security measures
offered by a third-party service provider do not create a legitimate privacy
interest. Second, the Court has held that a legitimate privacy interest
generally requires information to be physically concealed within one of a
limited number of constitutionally protected areas, such as a dwelling
house.150 And it would be difficult to argue that information exchanged with
an external automated processing system owned and operated by a thirdparty service provider remains effectively concealed within a protected area.
Third, in the absence of effective concealment, the Court has treated
information as though it were exposed in plain view of the public and

144
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government officials—no matter how unlikely their presence.151 Thus, a
legitimate privacy interest is not preserved because droplets of individual
information is obscured in an ocean of data or because the potential for
human observation of the data processed by an automated system is almost
nonexistent. It is enough that the data is potentially within reach. Fourth,
even where information remains within a protected area and out of plain
view, the Court has consistently held that voluntary disclosure to a trusted
third party vitiates any legitimate privacy interest.152 Hence, even if the Court
were to recognize automated processing as a secure system in which data is
effectively concealed, the conveyance of personal information to a thirdparty with the ability to access that data—even if such access is contractually
disclaimed—is treated as a disclosure.
The third-party doctrine is thus constructed upon a legal and factual
artifice. The user of an automated processing system is said to assume the
risk that the operator of that system will ignore all practical realities and legal
obligations by targeting, gathering, and choosing to share specific
information with government officials. In reality, however, this information
remains practically obscured in automated systems awash in data. Human
observation generally occurs only in the process of compliance with a
request, subpoena, or court order compelling production.
It is not terribly difficult to imagine how application of the
public/private third-party doctrine to automated systems impacts privacy
protections in an age of ubiquitous digital networks, third-party Internet
service providers and intermediaries, and cloud-based computing services—
all driven by the enormous amounts of data that is provided, created, used,
processed, stored, and transferred “in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks.”153 Many of the computing resources previously operated and
maintained by the user are now outsourced to third-party providers,154 with
data distributed across a vast network of privately-owned computing
systems. By disclosing personal information to these automated systems and
services, you abandon any legitimate expectation of privacy and assume the
risk that it will be shared with the government without a warrant. It makes
no difference that your service provider does not access your information
See supra Section I.B.1.
See supra Section I.B.2.
153 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
154 See Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 MINN .
L. REV . 985, 986 (2016); supra note 138, at 585.
151
152
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and promises not to do so. Likewise, privacy guarantees made in your terms
of service cannot create a legitimate privacy interest or defeat a subpoena for
compelled production.
As Judge Beverly Martin recently observed,
blunt application of the third-party doctrine threatens to allow the
government access to a staggering amount of information . . . . [B]y
allowing a third-party company access to our e-mail accounts, the
websites we visit, and our search-engine history—all for legitimate
business purposes—we give up any privacy interest in that
information . . . . I am convinced that most [I]nternet users would
be shocked by this.155
Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch has lately expressed similar
concerns.
The problem isn’t with the [lower court’s] application of Smith and
Miller but with the cases themselves. Can the government demand
a copy of all your e-mails from Google or Microsoft without
implicating your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it secure your
DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause? Smith
and Miller say yes it can—at least without running afoul of Katz.
But that result strikes most lawyers and judges today—me
included—as pretty unlikely.156
There is a growing sense that a majority of the Court agrees. In a series
of recent cases, the Court has begun to crack open the rigid application of
the public/private distinction—including the third-party doctrine. I explore
these developments in the next Part.
II. SUBVERTING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
The Court has consistently affirmed that a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when three basic elements are satisfied: (a) an impermissible
government intrusion (b) upon a legitimate privacy interest (c) in order to
obtain information.157 Following Katz, however, application of that standard
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 535–36 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
157 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–12 (1961)).
155
156
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essentially collapsed into a single inquiry operationalizing the public/private
distinction—whether the information sought by the government remained
physically concealed within one of a limited number of constitutionally
protected areas, neither exposed to plain view nor disclosed to a third party.
In this Part, I discuss three recent Supreme Court cases with the potential to
fundamentally reshape this inquiry: United States v. Jones (2012),158 Riley v.
California (2014),159 and Carpenter v. United States (2018).160 Taken
together, these decisions threaten to subvert the dominant role of the
public/private distinction and the need for effective concealment as a means
of preserving one’s legitimate privacy interest in personal information, with
significant implications for the third-party doctrine.
Jones signaled the Court’s initial willingness to depart from this rigid
approach, holding that the government violates the Fourth Amendment
when it trespasses upon an enumerated area (i.e., “persons, houses, papers,
and effects”) for the purpose of gathering information—even if the
information itself had been exposed to the public or disclosed to a third
party.161 In Riley, the Court recognized that the immense amounts of
personal information generated by and accessible through modern
technologies might require it to reconsider the balancing of interests
captured in certain categorical, bright-line rules of search and seizure law.162
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that information may
itself constitute a distinct object of Fourth Amendment protection in which
the individual maintains a legitimate privacy interest, independent of the
space or thing in which it is held.163 Thus, the fact that some of the personal
information accessible through Riley’s cell phone was stored on a thirdparty cloud server did not eliminate the individual’s privacy interest in that
information.164 In Carpenter, the Court drew on many of these same
principles to fashion a limitation on the third-party doctrine—effectively
transforming a categorical application of the public/private distinction into
a sort of balancing test in which the act of disclosure is measured against the

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
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nature of the data sought.165 This transformation required two key changes
in the doctrine. The Court held: first, that the disclosure or conveyance of
personal information to a third party significantly diminishes, rather than
eliminates, the individual’s legitimate privacy interest;166 and second, that
certain information is so revealing and sensitive that the degree of intrusion
arising from a governmental search will outweigh the diminishing effects of
that disclosure or conveyance.167 This progressive subversion of the
public/private distinction is discussed in the Sections that follow.
A.

United States v. Jones

In Jones, police attached a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking
device to the undercarriage of a suspect’s car and used that device to
continuously monitor the vehicle’s physical location and movements over a
twenty-eight day period.168 Prior to trial, Jones sought to suppress the
evidence obtained, arguing that the government’s actions constituted a
warrantless search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.169 The
government countered that, under Katz and its progeny, Jones had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in either the outer surface of the vehicle or
its movements along public streets, as these areas and information were
exposed to the public.170 Thus, no search had occurred when police obtained
information that was otherwise in plain view of the public and no warrant
was required.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court not only rejected the
government’s argument but found Katz to be altogether inapplicable in
resolving the question.171 Justice Scalia began his analysis with a basic
proposition: that the Court was constitutionally bound to “assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”172 And “for most of our history the
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 406–07.
Id. at 406 (citations omitted).
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Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for
government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’)
it enumerates.”173 Katz should not therefore be read as eliminating or
replacing these traditional protections, but instead as providing additional
and more expansive safeguards.174
In defining the essential substance of these privacy protections, the
Court reaffirmed that “a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment occurs, at a minimum, where . . . the Government [1] obtains
information [2] by physically intruding [3] on a constitutionally protected
area.”175 Thus, a minimalist version of the “common-law trespassory test”
had survived the transition from Olmstead to Katz, safeguarding those areas
specifically enumerated in the Fourth Amendment from impermissible
physical intrusion. Applying this standard to Jones, Scalia concluded that
monitoring a vehicle’s location (obtaining information) by attaching the
GPS tracking device (physical intrusion/trespass) to the suspect’s vehicle (a
constitutionally protected “effect”), constitutes an invalid warrantless
search.176
Having restored these traditional minimum safeguards as a distinct
theory of Fourth Amendment protection, the Jones Court was then left to
address the public nature of the locational information gathered by the GPS
device. The Court had previously held that “[a] person travelling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another,” because that
information is “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.”177 This
reasoning is consistent with the basic premise of the public/private
distinction, as applied through Katz, which treats the failure to conceal
information as if it were exposed in plain view. Relying on these earlier cases,
the government implicitly argued in Jones that a search producing only
public information cannot violate the Fourth Amendment. But Scalia
rejected that premise.

173

Id. at 406–07 (citations omitted).

Id. at 407–08, 409.
Id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. at 407
(majority opinion).
176 Id. at 404.
177 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)).
174
175
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In these earlier cases, the suspects’ location information had been
gathered without trespassing upon an enumerated area.178 The Court had
therefore applied the Katz standard, as developed through the public
exposure cases, finding the suspects’ privacy claims to be limited by the
failure to conceal their location from public view.179 In Jones, on the other
hand, the government did commit trespass, both in the process of attaching
the GPS device and when changing its battery.180 Under these circumstances,
the violation accrues at the moment of physical intrusion upon an
enumerated area for the purpose of gathering information. The public
nature of the information eventually gathered—in the sense that the
suspects’ location was exposed in plain view of the public—is therefore
irrelevant to the legitimacy of the privacy interest infringed by the prior act
of trespass.
Justice Alito, although concurring in the judgment, nevertheless
criticized Scalia for returning to the now-discredited Olmstead rule that “a
technical trespass followed by the gathering of evidence constitutes a
search.”181 But this seems a mischaracterization of the decision. Scalia did
not suggest that any trespass upon any private property is a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, he created a more narrow
exception to the public/private distinction for physical trespass upon certain
enumerated areas—”persons, houses, papers, and effects”182 —allowing that
in such cases individuals may retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in
information that has been exposed to the public or disclosed to a third party.
The Jones decision opened a crack in the public/private distinction by
resurrecting the trespass doctrine as “Step Zero”183 in the Fourth
Amendment analysis and applying that doctrine beyond the special
solicitude of the home. This Step Zero focuses on how police obtained the
178 Jones, 565 U.S. at 408–09 (discussing the beeper cases, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, and United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
179 Id. at 408–09 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82).
180 Id. at 403–04.
181 Id. at 421 (Alito, J., concurring).
182 Id. at 405 (majority opinion) (holding that the Fourth Amendment cannot be read to interpret
the phrase “in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” as “superfluous”); id. at 406 (noting that “for
most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for
government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates”); id. at 404
(finding Jones’s vehicle to be an “effect” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
183 The “Step Zero” formulation describes the initial inquiry into whether the governing legal
framework—here, Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy standard”—applies at all. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV . 187, 191 (2006) (discussing the most famous “Step Zero”).
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relevant information, i.e., whether it was obtained by trespass upon an
enumerated area. If so, the trespass itself constitutes an intrusion upon the
individual’s legitimate privacy interests. At that point, the public/private
distinction drops out of the picture. The unconstitutional intrusion is not
excused simply because the individual has no independent privacy interest
in the information collected, either because the information was in plain
view of the public or disclosed to a third party.
B.

Riley v. California

In Riley, the Court addressed protections for personal information
available on an individual’s cell phone, whether that information resides
locally on the phone itself184 or on remote servers accessible through the use
of phone-based applications.185 Officers conducting a routine search
incident to arrest found a cell phone in Riley’s pants pocket.186 An officer on
the scene “accessed information on the phone” that he believed indicated
Riley’s involvement with a gang.187 Following Riley’s transfer to the station
house, a detective “further examined the contents of the phone . . . looking
for evidence.”188 Certain pictures and videos found in the course of that
search provided key investigative information, with several being described
and/or submitted at trial.189 Riley challenged the warrantless search of the
content of his cell phone as unreasonable.190 The government, relying on
United States v. Robinson,191 responded that no warrant was required
because the search fell within a specific exception to the warrant
requirement192—permitting officers to examine the content of objects found
in the course of a search incident to a custodial arrest.193

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 379.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 379–80.
Id. at 379.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Riley, 573 U.S. at 383–84.
Id. at 382–85 (describing the search-incident-to-arrest exception).
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Acknowledging Robinson as a “categorical rule,”194 the Supreme Court
nevertheless rejected its application to a search of data stored on and
accessible by a cell phone.195 The Court first held that in determining
whether an exception to the warrant requirement is reasonable, it must
balance the legitimate governmental interests served by the warrantless
search against the intrusion upon an individual’s personal privacy.196
Applying this standard, the Court made a clear distinction between the
device (cell phone) and the data (content). The Court found that the risks
justifying the Robinson rule—harm to officers and destruction of evidence—
although manifest in physical objects, are de minimis “when the search is of
digital data.”197 Moreover, the degree of intrusion effected by a search of cell
phone data, measured by the quantity and nature of the personal
information revealed, “bears little resemblance” to a search of other physical
objects.198 The Court therefore “decline[d] to extend Robinson to searches of
data on cell phones . . . hold[ing] instead that officers must generally secure
a warrant before conducting such a search.”199
In reaching this conclusion, the Court was careful to recognize that the
functional relationship between the physical device and the digital data—i.e.,
that the device collects, uses, stores, shares, and provides access to data—
should not obscure the distinct and independent significance of personal
information in a Fourth Amendment analysis. Individuals may have a
legitimate and significant interest in that information qua information.
Certainly, cell phones are different from other “containers” discovered in the
course of a search incident to arrest. They are “minicomputers” with
“immense storage capacity,”200 running multiple software programs
(applications) that handle constant flows of varied and detailed
information.201 But it is the information itself that creates significant Fourth
Amendment concerns.

194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 385–86.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 394–97.
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The Court first draws this distinction between device and data in the
context of the personal information residing in local storage—i.e., in the
phone’s memory.202 As the Court observes, collecting vast quantities of “even
just one type of information . . . convey[s] far more than previously
possible.”203 And access to “many distinct types of information . . . reveal[s]
much more in combination than any isolated record.”204 Moreover, that data
is often retrospective, stretching back over long periods of time.205 And it is
this “revealing montage of the user’s life,”206 not the physical characteristics
of the object itself, that distinguishes the search of a cell phone from the
search of “a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”207
The analytical distinction between the device and the data is fully
realized, however, in the context of cloud computing. Many cell phones and
software applications seamlessly integrate cloud computing services,
allowing users to access “data stored on remote servers rather than on the
device itself.”208 “Cell phone users often may not know whether particular
information is stored on the device or in the cloud, and it generally makes
little difference. Moreover, the same type of data may be stored locally on
the device for one user and in the cloud for another.”209 This creates a
particular challenge for the search incident to arrest exception, which is
limited to “papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee.”210
Applying that limit in Riley, the Court distinguishes between the cell phone,
as a physical object located within the physical proximity of an arrestee, and
the data located in remote storage outside the physical proximity of an
arrestee.211 The physical aspects of the phone may be examined,212 for

202
203
204
205
206
207

Id. at 393–97.
Id. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 394–96.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 393.

Id. at 397.
Id. (citation omitted).
210 Id. at 398.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 387; see also People v. Ward, 169 A.D.3d 833, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (finding that “a
physical search of the phone, in which the police opened the back of the phone and looked under the
battery to obtain the phone’s serial number . . . did not implicate any of the aspects found to distinguish
a digital search from a search of any other physical object”).
208
209
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example, to ensure that it cannot be used as a weapon.213 But the exception
“may not be stretched to cover a search of files accessed remotely—that is, a
search of files stored in the cloud.”214
This discussion of cloud-based data is particularly relevant to Riley’s
significance as a subversion of the public/private distinction. Having
acknowledged the unique nature of the personal information available on a
cell phone, the Court rejected rote application of an existing categorical rule
that would have permitted police to search the contents of a cell phone seized
incident to arrest. Instead, the Court chose to revisit the balancing of
interests intended to be captured by that categorical rule. The public’s
interest in protecting officers and evidence was weighed against the
intrusion visited upon the individual’s legitimate privacy interests. Had the
Court rigidly applied the third-party doctrine to the cloud-based data
accessible through Riley’s cell phone, any legitimate privacy interest in that
data would have been eliminated from this analysis. Instead, the Court
found it noteworthy that police would have access to this data—stored
remotely, outside the physical proximity of an arrestee. Thus, one categorical
rule was exchanged for another, requiring a warrant prior to searching the
content of a cell phone seized incident to arrest.
C.

Carpenter v. United States

In Carpenter, the Court examined protections for metadata created by
the automated processes associated with the use of a cell phone; specifically,
cell-site location data (CSLI).215 Officers suspected that Carpenter was
involved in a series of nine robberies occurring over a four-month period.216
Seeking to establish that Carpenter was in the vicinity at the time of each
robbery, prosecutors obtained a statutory court order issued pursuant to the
Stored Communications Act (SCA),217 compelling Carpenter’s wireless
Riley, 573 U.S. at 387.
Id. at 397 (citation omitted).
215 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (stating the question presented as
“whether the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical
cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements”); see also id.
at 2211–12 (describing CSLI and how it is generated).
216 Id. at 2212.
217 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018).
213
214
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carriers to turn over four months of CSLI for his cellular telephone.218
“Altogether the Government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging
Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.”219
Carpenter sought to suppress these records at trial,220 arguing that the
information sought by law enforcement was protected by the Fourth
Amendment and that the government was therefore required to obtain a
judicial warrant rather than a court order issued pursuant to the SCA.221 The
district court denied the motion222 and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that Carpenter had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
his location information because he had voluntarily shared it with his
wireless carriers.223
This conclusion reflects the rigidity of the public exposure and thirdparty disclosure cases. Applying the public-exposure doctrine, Carpenter’s
physical proximity to the robberies had been “voluntarily conveyed to
anyone who wanted to look,”224 and information that “a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”225 Having failed to effectively conceal himself within a protected
area, all of Carpenter’s location information would be treated as though it
were continuously exposed in plain view, observed, tracked, and recorded.
Likewise, even if one might claim a privacy interest in public location
information more generally, that claim is extinguished by the voluntary act
of disclosure or conveyance to a third party226—here, Carpenter’s wireless
provider.227 As explained in Miller and Smith, the third-party doctrine does
not “distinguish between kinds of information disclosed to third parties and
require courts to decide whether to ‘extend’ [the third-party doctrine] to
particular classes of information, depending on their sensitivity.”228 Thus,
the intensely personal and revealing nature of CSLI would be largely
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis.
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12.
Id. at 2212.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2213.
Id. at 2215 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (citations omitted).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
Id. at 2212, 2220.
Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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On review, however, the Supreme Court rejected this binary
conception of privacy, marking a significant shift in application of the
public/private distinction. Adopting a more flexible analysis, the Court
transformed this bright-line rule into a balancing test, measuring the act of
exposure and/or disclosure against both the manner of surveillance and the
nature of the information sought. After Carpenter, exposure and/or
disclosure of personal information to a third party does not eliminate the
individual’s legitimate privacy interest in that information—as was the case
under the categorical approach—but is instead treated as merely
diminishing the individual’s expectation of privacy. In some cases, the
surveillance will be so permeating and the information so sensitive that the
individual’s privacy interest and resulting degree of intrusion will outweigh
the diminishing effects of exposure and/or disclosure, triggering the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.
Applying this new balancing test, the Court focused its analysis on the
“unique”229 and “deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its
collection.”230 Unlike the limited locational data that could be gathered using
traditional law enforcement methods,231 CSLI is an exhaustive and “detailed
chronical of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment,
over several years.”232 Thus, the privacy implications of each locational data
point cannot be viewed in isolation, but as an aggregated whole that
“provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his
particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations’”233—what the Court describes as the
“privacies of life.”234 Measuring this unremitting collection of sensitive data
against the act of disclosure, the Court observes that the information “is not
truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term” but is rather
automatically produced merely through the use of a device (cellphone)
“indispensable to participation in modern society.”235 The diminishing effect

229
230
231
232
233
234
235

Id. at 2217, 2220 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2223.
Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2220.
Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
Id. at 2220.
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of disclosure is therefore insufficient to outweigh Carpenter’s legitimate
privacy interest.
III. A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In this Part, I propose a framework for analyzing a user’s Fourth
Amendment interests in the metadata generated by automated devices and
systems; specifically, where that metadata is accessed, collected, and stored
by third-party providers. Taken together, Jones, Riley, and Carpenter
transform the third-party doctrine from a broad, technology-neutral
standard into a differentiated and potentially technology-dependent
balancing test. Carpenter provides one specific example, holding that law
enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to obtaining seven or more days of
historical CSLI metadata.236 What these cases fail to provide, however, is a
clear and thorough accounting of how this new approach can and should be
applied to other metadata-intensive technologies. My proposed framework
fills this gap, working within the basic structure of the Carpenter balancing
test but identifying a series of factors and subfactors to be considered in
evaluating each element. The result is a consistent, comprehensive, and
generalized approach to the creation of technology-specific standards that
effectuate the Court’s strong preference for workable, bright-line rules in
implementing the warrant requirement.
My proposal proceeds in four parts. First, I establish the basic structure
of the Carpenter balancing test, as an adaption of the Fourth Amendment
“reasonableness” analysis. Second, I describe the fundamental concerns and
constitutional principles guiding development of the proposed framework.
Third, I set forth the entirety of the proposed framework, identifying and
categorizing the various factors to be considered in constructing a workable
approach to the development of categorical rules for metadata generated by
automated systems. Fourth, I explore multiple examples of how this
framework might be applied to other technologies and metadata sets.

236

Id. at 2217.
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The Carpenter Balancing Test

Carpenter recognizes that new automated technologies require the
Court to reassess the balancing of interests captured by the third-party
doctrine. Although the public/private distinction remains a factor in the
“reasonableness” analysis, it is not always determinative. Application of the
third-party doctrine must reflect and be limited by “the basic purpose” of the
Fourth Amendment: “safeguard[ing] the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasion by government officials.”237 In effectuating this
fundamental purpose, the Court is “informed by historical understandings
‘of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth
Amendment] was adopted,’”238 including general warrants authorizing “an
unrestrained search”239 of nearly anyone, at any time, with little suspicion or
none at all.240 Thus, the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard must
be applied so as to “secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”241
Guided by these basic principles, Carpenter measures the act of
disclosure against the nature of the information sought. This balancing
approach involves a three-step analysis. Step one determines the strength
and legitimacy of an individual’s privacy interest in the information sought
by the government. Step two considers the extent to which disclosure or
conveyance of personal information to a third party diminishes an
individual’s legitimate privacy interest in that information. Step three
balances the individual privacy interest against the diminishing effect of
third-party disclosure. In some cases, the information will be so sensitive
and so revealing that the degree of intrusion arising from a governmental
search will outweigh the diminishing effects of disclosure. In such cases, a
warrant is generally required.

237
238
239
240
241

Id. at 2213 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2214 (punctuation omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
Id. at 2213.
Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1194 (2016).
Carpenter, 138 U.S. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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Guiding Principles

In constructing the proposed framework, I am guided by an
overarching concern about the government’s ability to derive sensitive
personal information from seemingly innocuous metadata, and its
implications for basic Fourth Amendment principles. An individual’s
legitimate privacy interest should effectuate constitutional restraints upon
“a too permeating police surveillance”242—surveillance that “spread[s]
through” an individual’s life and is “present in every part of it.”243 This
concern reflects the reality of modern technologies. The devices themselves
are pervasive and persistent. So is the mechanism for producing, collecting,
and sharing data. This process is so “remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient”244
that the need for time, money, and resources provides little constraint.
Nearly all of this data is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled,”245 where it essentially remains in permanent storage. It is an
unremitting process so embedded in the fabric of our daily lives that “[o]nly
the few [can] escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”246
The vast stores of metadata produced by this unrelenting surveillance
are often “deeply revealing” in their breadth and comprehensive reach,247
providing “an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing . . . ‘familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’”248— what Chief
Justice Roberts describes as “the privacies of life.”249 Providing the
government with access to all of this privately held data would risk “arbitrary
invasions” reminiscent of the “reviled general warrants and writs of
assistance of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage
through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal
Id. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
Permeate, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/
permeate [https://perma.cc/P2DM-DU82] (defining “permeate” as “to spread through something and
be present in every part of it”); see also Permeate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/permeate [https://perma.cc/SDW6-S6A2] (defining “permeate” as “to diffuse
through or penetrate something”).
244 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18.
245 Id. at 2216.
246 Id. at 2218.
247 Id. at 2223.
242
243

248
249

Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring)).
Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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activity.”250 Understanding that a search of this metadata will often expose
“private aspects of identity,”251 the absence of adequate safeguards “chills
associational and expressive freedoms.”252 The question is not precisely how
much or how many types of data are provided, but what that data can tell
you.
It was these basic concerns about persistent and indiscriminate
surveillance, access to immense databases, and the arbitrary exercise of
government power that led the Riley Court to exempt cellphones from the
search-incident-to-arrest exception, citing the degree of intrusion resulting
from an unrestrained search of the device. The Court was troubled not only
by the amount and variety of data accessible through a cellphone but also the
retrospective nature of the data, enabling the government to reconstruct a
“revealing montage of the user’s life.”253 Likewise, in Jones and Carpenter, the
Court held that “individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
whole of their physical movements,”254 because society does not “reasonably
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”255 As in Riley, CSLI
surveillance runs against everyone all the time, creating a comprehensive
dossier from which sensitive information can be derived and which
therefore “implicates basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary
government power.”256

250 Id. at 2213 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403
(2014) (quotations and citations omitted).
251 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216
(analogizing the nature of the information derived from the GPS data at issue in Jones to the CSLI
records at issue in Carpenter).
252 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
253 Riley, 573 U.S. at 396; id. at 403 (finding that cell phones “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies
of life’”).
254 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
255 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J. concurring); see also id. at 415 (expressing concern that “a
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements . . . reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”).
256 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
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Proposed Framework

The proposed framework fills significant analytical gaps left open by
Jones, Riley, and Carpenter—identifying a series of factors and subfactors to
be considered in evaluating each element of the new balancing test. My goal
is to provide lower courts with a consistent, comprehensive, and generalized
approach to the creation of technology-specific standards that effectuate the
Court’s strong preference for workable, bright-line rules.
Step (1): Defining the Privacy Interest
In determining the legitimacy and strength of the privacy interest in
particular metadata, two factors are considered: (a) the nature of the
metadata generated and collected, and (b) the ability to derive personal
information from aggregated metadata.
(a) Factor: Nature of the Metadata Generated and Collected. Courts
should consider the following: (i) government access to
comprehensive dossiers of historical metadata and (ii)
undifferentiated collection and long-term storage of metadata.
i.
Subfactor: Comprehensive Dossiers of Historical Metadata.
Metadata-intensive technologies—such as Internet
browsers, cellphones, and smart-home appliances—are
now a pervasive part of modern society. These automated
technologies are continually generating, collecting, and
storing vast amounts of metadata. Unlike the information
that could be gathered using traditional law enforcement
methods, these exhaustive stores of metadata are
“compiled every day, every moment, over several years.”257
A court should consider that the very existence of a
comprehensive dossier of sensitive metadata constitutes
the type of inescapable surveillance that creates a
significant risk of arbitrary government invasion.
ii.
Subfactor: Undifferentiated Collection and Long-Term
Storage of Metadata. This pervasive surveillance runs
against nearly everyone, all the time, so police need not
know who they want to follow in advance. In the case of

257

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
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CSLI metadata, for instance, the government “can now
travel back in time [and] . . . whoever the suspect turns out
to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment of every
day for five years.”258 A court should therefore consider
whether the metadata sought by the government is so
broadly collected and stored that a retroactive search, even
where individualized, exceeds society’s expectations.
(b) Factor: Ability to Derive Personal Information from Aggregated
Metadata. This factor is primarily concerned with the degree to
which the metadata sought by the government is likely to reveal the
privacies of life, generally defined by reference to eight categories
of sensitive information.259
1. Finances—e.g., budgeting, commercial transactions.260
2. Legal matters—e.g., meeting with a criminal defense
attorney.261
3. Physical and mental health—e.g., meeting with a
psychiatrist, plastic surgeon, abortion clinic, or AIDS
treatment center;262 treatment for an alcohol, drug, or
gambling addition;263 tracking pregnancy symptoms;264
web searches related to a certain disease or condition.265
4. Sexual orientation, associations, and activities266—e.g.,
trips to a strip club, by-the-hour motel, or gay bar;267 dating
applications.268
5. Familial associations269—e.g., trips to a private residence.270
Id. at 2218.
See supra Section II.C.
260 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014).
261 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–200 (N.Y. 2009) (cited with approval in United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring)).
262 Id.
263 Riley, 573 U.S. at 396.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 395–96.
266 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415, 416 (Sotomayor, J. concurring); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
267 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199–200.
268 Riley, 573 U.S. at 396.
258
259

269
270

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
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6. Professional associations271—e.g., union meetings.272
7. Political beliefs, affiliations, and activities273—e.g.,
following political party news,274 trips to political
headquarters.275
8. Religious beliefs and affiliations276—e.g., trips to a mosque,
synagogue, or church;277 sharing prayer requests.278
Assessing the government’s ability to derive this type of sensitive
information from aggregated metadata requires a two-part inquiry,
examining both the possibility and probability that the category of data
sought by the government will reveal sensitive information.
i.
Subfactor: The Possibility of a Reliable Linkage. Possibility
requires simply that a court find it abstractly possible that
there is some reliable linkage between the metadata
generated and personal information that might be derived
from its collection. Here, the Court has not indicated that
attenuation is a concern, but only that a direct linkage is
possible. CSLI records provide a good example. Generally
speaking, the data provided to law enforcement consists of
cell-site registration data, indicating the cell-site to which
a particular phone was connected at a particular time. Law
enforcement also has access to a list of cell-site locations,
indicating where each cell site is located (longitude and
latitude) and the geographical sector served by each of the
various antennas located on that cell site. By mapping the
cell-site registration data onto the list of cell-site locations,
law enforcement is able to derive a fairly accurate
approximation of where a user’s cell phone was located at
various times of the day, as well as their movements. It is
this geographical location data “that enables the

271
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275
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Id. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199–200 (cited with approval in Jones, 565 U.S. at 415).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16.
Riley, 573 U.S. at 396 (discussing “apps for Democratic Party news and Republican Party news”).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
Id. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16.
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Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”279
Subfactor: The Probability of a Reliable Linkage. The
probability analysis considers two aspects of the metadata
sought to determine whether and under what
circumstances a particular category of data is likely to
reveal sensitive information: precision and/or detail and
amount and/or density.
• Precision and/or Detail. First, a court should
examine the level of data precision and detail;
including, in some cases, whether the data is timestamped.280 For instance, in Jones, Justice
Sotomayor found that GPS systems using multiple
satellites had the ability to “establish[] the vehicle’s
location within 50 to 100 feet.”281 The Court
reached a similar result in Carpenter, even though
the accuracy of CSLI was less than that of GPS
data.282
• Amount and/or Density. Second, a court should
consider the amount and/or density of data within
that category. This is perhaps the most difficult
aspect of the analysis. It is clear, however, that the
longer the period of time and the more data points
collected (i.e., sustained density), the more likely it
is that the data will reveal sensitive information.
But it is equally apparent that the amount and/or
density of data required may vary based on the
precision and detail of that data. In Carpenter, for
example, the Court found that obtaining 127 days
of location tracking data with an average of 101
data points per day was sufficient to establish the
government’s ability to ascertain sensitive

Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

The Court also appears to require in all cases that the data be recorded and aggregated by the
service provider. Id.
281 Id. at 403 (majority opinion).
282 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
280
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information, even where the accuracy of CSLI was
less than that of GPS data.283 Justice Sotomayor
posited, however, that “even short-term
monitoring” that produces a “precise,
comprehensive record” may be sufficiently likely
to reveal sensitive information.284 This conclusion
is supported by Carpenter, which held that a
warrant was required for each of two distinct CSLI
record requests—one covering 152 days from
MetroPCS, the other just seven days from Sprint
(which ultimately produced only two days of
records).285
Step (2): Diminishing Effects of Disclosure
The third-party doctrine holds that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”286 Framed through the lens of the public/private distinction, this
analysis remained primarily focused on the individual’s ability to proactively
conceal information.287 In the absence of active and effective concealment it
was assumed that information had been voluntarily disclosed.288 In the
context of automated systems, the choice to utilize a particular service or
device was itself a failure to conceal all associated data, which is therefore
said to have been voluntarily disclosed to the provider.
In Carpenter, the Court concludes that this categorical rule cannot be
mechanically extended to automated, data-intensive technologies. In some
cases, disclosure diminishes an individual’s privacy interest in information
but does not eliminate it. Not all acts of “voluntary exposure” impose the
same degree of diminution.289 In determining the degree of diminution, the
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Id. at 2212.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 415.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
See discussion supra Section I.D.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
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Court focuses on the voluntariness of that disclosure to determine whether
the data was “truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”290
Drawing from Carpenter and Riley, I identify two key factors in
assessing the degree to which metadata is truly and voluntarily shared with
the third-party provider: (a) the extent to which the device or service
generating the metadata is a necessity to participation in a modern society,
and (b) the user’s practical ability to control the automated generation and
conveyance of metadata to a third party during the use of that device or
service.
(a) Factor: Necessity of the Device or Service to Participation in a
Modern Society. The necessity analysis acknowledges that certain
data-intensive devices and services are now essentially
“indispensable to participation in modern society.”291 Here, a court
should consider the role of the device or service in society—both
personal and professional—as well as structural adaptions that
increasingly require always-on connectivity. Studies indicate, for
instance, that ninety percent of Americans use the Internet292 and
ninety-six percent own a cellphone (eighty-one percent of which
are smartphones).293 It is worth noting that these pervasive and
persistent devices are more likely to be present in private places and
situations, producing, collecting, and sharing immense amounts of
data from which sensitive information is likely to be derived.294
Cellphones, for instance, are “such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life”295 that people “compulsively carry” them at all times”296—
“beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s
offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing

290
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Id.
Id.

292 Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. C TR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband
[https://perma.cc/QGS7MKTR].
293 Mobile
Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Feb. 5, 2018),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile [https://perma.cc/H6SM-7U33].
294 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
295
296

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
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locales.”297 Almost like a feature of human anatomy,298 “nearly
three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of
their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even
use their phones in the shower.”299
(b) Factor: Ability to Control Automated Metadata Generation and
Collection. In assessing the user’s ability to control the conveyance
of metadata to a third party during the use of that device or service,
courts should consider three subfactors: first, whether the category
of data sought by the government is automatically generated,
“without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up;”300 second, which and what percentage of activities
carried out through the device or service generate the category of
data sought;301 and third, whether it is possible to lessen or
eliminate the conveyance of the category of data sought without
abandoning the device or service.302
Step (3): Balancing
In the final step of the analysis, the individual’s privacy interest is
balanced against the diminishing effect of third-party disclosure to
determine whether she enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
metadata sought by the government. If so, and assuming no exception
applies, access to that data constitutes a Fourth Amendment search and a
warrant is presumptively required. In making this assessment, a court
should be guided by the basic purposes of the Fourth Amendment:
protecting the privacies of life against arbitrary invasion and too permeating
police surveillance.
In the absence of additional guidance, Carpenter provides a single point
of comparison for future cases. Carpenter holds that individuals have a
legitimate privacy interest in the whole of their physical movements,
primarily because access to those records is likely to reveal sensitive
information. CSLI metadata provides a precise and detailed accounting of
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Id.
Riley, 573 U.S. at 385.
Id. at 395.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220.
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an individual’s location and movements, establishing a reliable linkage to the
privacies of life. Given the sustained density of CSLI metadata collection,
there is a high probability that government access to even a short period of
CSLI metadata will reveal sensitive information. Moreover, this
comprehensive metadata is collected on nearly everyone and stored for long
periods, creating the risk of arbitrary retroactive surveillance. An individual
therefore has a legitimate and significant privacy interest in her CSLI
metadata. Carpenter then determines that CSLI metadata is not truly shared
and thus that third-party disclosure does little to diminish an individual’s
privacy interest. This reflects both the necessity of a cellphone to
participation in modern society and the user’s inability to adequately control
the disclosure of CSLI metadata without giving up the cellphone itself. The
practical inability to escape this constant and revealing surveillance creates a
reasonable expectation of privacy and demands Fourth Amendment
protection.
D.

Using the Proposed Framework to Derive Bright-Line Rules

In this Section, I explore how this proposed framework could be
applied to other automated technologies and metadata sets.
Real-Time CSLI. “Prospective, or real-time, CSLI permits police to
determine the phone’s current location as it registers with each tower.”303
Police may seek current records or ask the cellular provider to “ping” the
cellphone to determine its current location—for instance, when searching
for a fugitive.304 As relevant to the proposed framework, a request for realtime CSLI differs from historical CSLI in three key ways. First, although
cellular providers compile comprehensive dossiers of historical CSLI, a
request for real-time CSLI does not involve a substantially retroactive search
of that database. Second, in most cases these requests will produce far fewer
data points over a very limited period of time.305 Third, police will often
request that the cellular provider actively initiate collection of CSLI by

303 Christian Bennardo, Note, The Fourth Amendment, CSLI Tracking, and the Mosaic Theory, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2385, 2392 (2017).
304 See, e.g., Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 636–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
305 See, e.g., id. at 646 (addressing a Fourth Amendment challenge to police access of just three hours
of real-time CSLI records, in which the suspect’s cellular provider pinged his phone fewer than five
times).
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“pinging” the individual’s cellphone—as opposed to tracking the cellphone’s
attempt to connect with the network.
As applied in step one of the proposed framework, these distinctions
weaken the individual’s privacy interest in particular metadata. Although
real-time CSLI draws upon the metadata generated by persistent
surveillance, a targeted request for a limited amount of current information
does not implicate concerns of undifferentiated collection and retroactive
tracking to the same degree, lessening the risk of arbitrary government
invasion. Moreover, narrow metadata requests—limited in amount and
density—are less likely to reveal the privacies of life sought to be secured by
the Fourth Amendment. It is worth noting, however, that repeated and
proximate requests for real-time CSLI will, at some point, begin to take on
many of the same characteristics and concerns of historical CSLI. As Justice
Sotomayor observed in Jones, “even short-term monitoring” that produces
a “precise, comprehensive record” may be sufficiently likely to reveal
sensitive information,306 strengthening the individual’s privacy interest.
In step two, certain methods of acquiring real-time CSLI may diminish
an individual’s privacy interest in that metadata to an even lesser degree than
historical CSLI. Carpenter recognized that a cellphone user has little
practical ability to control the conveyance of metadata to a third-party, in
part because CSLI is automatically generated by the cellphone itself “by dint
of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user.”307 When
a cellular provider initiates the exchange of metadata at the government’s
request—pinging an otherwise inactive phone—the act of disclosure is
entirely involuntary and the third-party doctrine has minimal diminishing
effect.
The structured approach of the proposed framework bears fruit in the
final step of the analysis, in which the individual’s privacy interest is
balanced against the diminishing effects of third-party disclosure. A case
comparison helps illustrate this point. In Sims v. State,308 police located a
suspect by initiating the exchange of real-time CSLI metadata. The court
concluded that Sims “did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
physical movements or his location as reflected in the less than three hours
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see also id. (observing that “[a]part from disconnecting the phone
from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data”).
308 569 S.W.3d 634.
306
307
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of real-time CSLI records accessed by police by pinging his phone less than
five times.”309 In reaching this result, the court focused almost exclusively on
the amount of metadata requested.
Under the Sims approach, the search analysis does not turn on the
content of the CSLI records but instead on whether the government
searched or seized “enough” information that it violated a legitimate
expectation of privacy. There is no bright-line rule for determining how long
police must track a person’s cellphone in real time before it violates a
person’s legitimate expectation of privacy in those records. Whether a
person has a recognized expectation of privacy in real-time CSLI records
must be decided on a case-by-case basis.310
The Sims court’s approach suffers from two key deficiencies. First, it
fails to account for both the commonalities and differences between
historical and real-time CSLI. Second, it precludes the use of a balancing test
for the creation of workable, bright-line rules.
The proposed framework remedies both concerns. As described above,
the multi-factor analysis identifies three key distinctions between real-time
and historical CSLI—retroactivity, amount or density, and control over the
act of disclosure—each of which potentially impacts the outcome of the
balancing test. They also provide a principled basis for the formulation of
bright-line rules. In the Sims case, for instance, police sought a limited
amount of current data targeting a specific individual. The suspect’s privacy
interest was therefore significantly weaker than that recognized in
Carpenter. It was the police, however, that initiated the metadata exchange
by pinging Sims’s cellphone, minimizing any diminishing effects of thirdparty disclosure. Balancing these competing elements, a court might
conclude that these distinctions are immaterial and that a warrant is
therefore required for both historical and real-time CSLI. On the other hand,
it might find the retroactive nature of the data request to be determinative
and conclude that no warrant is required for real-time CSLI. Alternatively,
it could draw a line at control over the act of disclosure, requiring police to
obtain a warrant only before initiating a ping of the suspect’s cellphone. In
each case, the court would be engaging in the principled development of
workable rules that effectuate the basic purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
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IP Addresses.
Each time a customer connects [to the Internet], the ISP [Internet
Service Provider] assigns a unique identifier, known as an IP
address, to the customer’s computer terminal. Depending on the
ISP, a customer’s IP address can change each time he logs on to the
Internet. ISPs retain . . . records of the IP addresses that they assign
to customers [for up to ninety days].311
In many cases, a user’s physical location can be derived from the IP address.
An ISP’s IP address records share several common characteristics with
CSLI. First, these records provide a comprehensive historical database of a
user’s points of Internet access, gathered on nearly every American.312
Second, IP addresses “convey location information with similar degrees of
specificity” as CSLI.313 Third, Internet access is “indispensable to
participation in modern society”314 and IP addresses are automatically
generated and collected as part of that process. Nevertheless, most courts to
consider the application of Carpenter to IP address records “have adopted a
categorical approach”315 that essentially ignores these key differences; it is
enough that IP addresses weren’t CSLI.
Recognizing that the concerns expressed in Carpenter are implicated
by other automated technologies, the proposed framework provides a more
structured and principled basis for this distinction. As relevant to the
identified factors, IP address records do not provide the amount or sustained
density of locational metadata as CSLI, and that metadata is retained for a
much shorter period. Hardwired and wireless broadband access is generally
limited to certain locations, while cellular access is essentially identical to
that of CSLI. Moreover, it can be argued that IP addresses are not
automatically generated “without any affirmative act on the part of the user
beyond powering up”316 but requires the user to open an Internet browser or
other network application. Each of these discrepancies’ maps to a relevant
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United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010).
Supra note 292.
United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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factor in the proposed framework, potentially tilting the outcome of the
balancing test and supporting a different bright-line rule.
Focusing exclusively on the potential for IP addresses to provide
location information, the ultimate question remains whether this metadata
is the type of “detailed and comprehensive record of a person’s movements”
that is likely to reveal the privacies of life.317 A court might conclude, for
instance, that Internet browsing will never provide the necessary amount or
sustained density of locational data to provide that linkage. Courts may
reach a different result, however, where the IP address is generated by
software applications that automatically connect to the Internet even when
not in use. Alternatively, a court might draw a line between stationary
technologies (e.g., desktop, connected appliance) and mobile devices (e.g.,
laptop, smartphone) that “automatically connects to the wireless internet of
his . . . subway, local coffee shop, or park.”318 As this discussion
demonstrates, the proposed framework avoids the ham-handed division
between CSLI and everything else. Instead, courts are able to draw
principled distinctions between automated technologies and metadata sets.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to do four things. First, I have attempted
to demonstrate that the conventional narrative of modern Fourth
Amendment doctrine obscures the dominant and broadly significant role of
the public/private distinction in limiting privacy protections, even to the
point of subordinating property rights. Second, I have framed the thirdparty doctrine as an application of the public/private distinction, eliminating
an individual’s legitimate privacy interest in personal information disclosed
or conveyed to service providers. Third, I have explored how three recent
Supreme Court cases promise to subvert the dominant role of the
public/private distinction, applying a more flexible, balancing approach that
contemplates Fourth Amendment protection for certain categories of data,
independent of physical location. Fourth, I have proposed an analytical
framework that brings structure and clarity to the Court’s new approach.
Lower courts have struggled to understand and apply the Supreme
Court’s recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to other technologies. In
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the absence of clear guidance from the Court, most have narrowly confined
these new cases to their precise facts, returning instead to a misconceived
Katz analysis. Others have persevered but the results have been uneven and
often contradictory.
This Article brings coherence to the difficult process of developing
workable rules that adequately capture the Court’s intended approach to
difficult questions of digital privacy. It begins by reframing modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence so as to illuminate the significance of recent
cases. These cases are explored in depth, drawing out the basic structure of
the Court’s analysis and identifying those factors relevant to its balancing
approach. Situating those factors in the broader analysis, a three-step
framework is then proposed—to be used by lower courts as they develop
bright-line rules for each of the different categories of data generated by
digital technologies and services.

